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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. The Foreign Scene. With Khrushchev off on a tour of Central Asia to inspect Soviet agriculture and with the report that Foreign Minister Gromyko has left Moscow on vacation, the center of attention in Moscow seems to have shifted temporarily from the momentous issues of war and peace to domestic developments. Although the usual drum-fire of anti-German propaganda was maintained, there was no indication in the Soviet press of any shift in the Soviet position on Berlin-Germany. Despite the installation of the new FRG cabinet, there was no authoritative Soviet press evaluation of this event or speculation of what it bodes for a settlement of the Berlin crisis. One got the impression that Moscow now is waiting for the outcome of Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington and for the shaping-up of the Western positions. In contrast to the posture adopted by the Soviet press, the dominant topic of conversation among Western diplomats in Moscow was Ambassador Kroll's recall to Bonn for consultations and the difficult-to-trace source of the rumor that the Soviet position on Germany has softened.

Other major international developments in which the USSR has a big stake, such as the Albanian affair and the complex of crises in Southeast Asia, also received low-key treatment in the Soviet papers.

2. Berlin-Germany. The Embassy delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry on November 16, in reply to a Soviet note on October 18, in which the US again rejected Soviet contentions about abuses of the air corridors. The note concluded with a warning to the Soviets not to interfere with Allied air access to Berlin.

In contrast to the relatively restrained reporting in the Soviet press about developments involving access by Western official civilians to East Berlin, a Soviet lecturer in a public talk boasted that US "shows of force" has been exposed as simply gestures following the arrival of Soviet tanks on the scene. The speaker claimed that the Western Powers have acquiesced in Vopo controls over such traffic by adopting similar controls on November 1, and that these events and the lack of Western resistance to the August 13 measures prove the West is accepting the existence of the GDR.

The newly-named FRG cabinet has been characterized by Soviet propaganda as "the weakest Adenauer cabinet yet" and as composed of representatives of the same old reactionary ruling circles. Foreign Minister Schroeder's former Nazi Party membership was specially noted.

On November 14 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the German Charge and informed him that two West German tourists (Mr. and Mrs. Werner) have been arrested for espionage activities for which the US allegedly bears some responsibility.

3. Nuclear Tests. With the apparent tapering off of the current nuclear test series, the Soviets have stepped up their campaign to justify their own tests and to shift responsibility to the West for any further testing. A Pravda

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commentary on November 12, for example, claimed that Western politicians were exaggerating the degree of atmospheric pollution from Soviet tests and charged that American tests still outnumber Soviet detonations. Selected foreign comments were also cited to give the impression that the US has ejected far more radioactive material in the atmosphere than has the Soviet Union. In making these charges, the Soviet press has continued to remain silent on the number and magnitude of the tests conducted by the Soviet Union.

In keeping with UN Resolution 1649 on nuclear testing, the US and [redacted] delivered similar notes at Moscow on November 13 [redacted] Although no official answer has yet been received, an Izvestiya commentary on November 15 again suggested that the problem of testing should be resolved within the context of general and complete disarmament. 181

4. Finland. Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen held talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in connection with the Soviet note of October 30 to Finland. The Soviet press reported Karjalainen's arrival, departure, and attendance at official functions. All papers carried an almost complete text of the final communique, but with the exception of Red Star, the Ministry of Defense newspaper, omitted the two important sentences referring to military consultations. In general, the Soviet press offerred few clues as to what Moscow is driving at in its renewal of pressure on Finland.

5. Far East. Soviet-Chinese Relations. A landmark in Soviet press treatment of Soviet-Chinese relations occurred on November 16, when Pravda published a running account and excerpts of Italian Communist leader Togliatti's November 10 speech in which he accused the Chinese of supporting "in part" the deviant Albanians and said that Chou En-lai was unjustified in criticizing Khrushchev's open condemnation of the Albanians during the 22nd CPSU Congress. Although the intelligent element of the Soviet public could surmise that Soviet-Chinese relations are deteriorating from what the press has reported or omitted to report, Soviet publications during the past few years have rarely, if ever, so explicitly pointed to concrete disagreement between Moscow and Peiping as do these passages from Togliatti speech. This development represents a further step in the gradual and gentle exposure to the Soviet public of the decline in Soviet-Chinese relations.

Southeast Asia. Although the Soviet press followed its usual practice of saying virtually nothing about Laotian developments, there were a few articles indicating an increase of tension in South Vietnam and between Thailand and Cambodia. There also was a Pravda article commenting on the possibility of a merger between Malaya and Singapore. The villain in all articles was the US, which was portrayed as resorting to desperate measures to shore up its declining position in the area and as seeking to expand its influence at the expense of other "imperialist" interests.

Northeast Asia. Pak Chong-hui's trip to Tokyo and Washington has been used by the Soviet press to revive an old canard--that the US is organizing a Northeast Asia Collective Security Organization as part of a global anti-communist system. Pak himself is being characterized as the current Korean expression of an ultra-reactionary.

6. AFRICA

Sudan. Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, left Moscow for the Sudan for a state visit on November 14. The visit returns a similar trip made to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Abboud of the Sudan in July, 1961. The presence of high-ranking trade officials in the Brezhnev party indicates that questions involving economic and technical assistance will be given high priority during the visit.

Mali. A Mali military delegation headed by Mamadu Kiakite, State Secretary for Questions of Defense and Security, arrived in Moscow on November 6 and was received at the Ministry of Defense on November 9 by Marshals Malinovsky, Grechko, and Zakharov. This high level treatment suggests that such broad questions as military and technical assistance, cadet training, and an exchange of military attaches were possibly under discussion.

Congo. The UN commission's report on the death of Lumumba was used by the Soviet press as a departure point to criticize Tshombe and alleged Belgian monopolists who were using Tshombe to serve their own interests. An Izvestiya commentary of November 16 also charged that a full investigation would show the infamous role played by the US, UK and France, who collectively support the Belgian colonizers.

Algeria. The Soviets staged a half-hour demonstration before the French Embassy on November 16, which earlier had been designated as Algeria Day. The demonstration was presumably undertaken to reflect ostensible Soviet sympathy and alarm over the hunger strike of Ben Bella and other members of the provisional Algerian government held by the French and to mirror continued Soviet anxiety over the "unjust war" being waged by France against the Algerians. The demonstration was better-controlled and on a modest scale compared to that directed against the Belgian Embassy following the death of Patrice Lumumba and against the US Embassy at the time of the Cuban invasion in 1961.

7. Latin America. Recent Latin American events, including particularly Arosemena's assumption of power in Ecuador, were hailed in Soviet propaganda as proof that the forces of national liberation movements are on the march throughout Latin America. Arosemena's victory was coupled with Goulart's in Brazil and both are described as defeats for American imperialism. Such developments as the Bolivian Parliament's praise of the Soviet revolution were used to support this theme.

OAS consideration of the Colombian proposal designed to lead to sanctions against Castro has been treated with some apparent concern, but subsequent evidence of opposition among Latin American countries has been greeted as further proof of growing anti-American sentiment in South America.

Venezuela's severance of relations with Cuba, on the other hand, was denounced as an act of subservience to Washington by Betancourt.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

8. De-Stalinization and the "Anti-Party Group": The week brought further implementation of the regime's de-Stalinization campaign; continuing manifestations of the campaign against the "anti-Party group", and some signs that these activities were neither well-understood nor wholeheartedly approved by at least some Soviet people.

Following the renaming of Stalino, in the Donbass (WEEKA No. 45), the "hero-city" of Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd on November 10, and Stalinabad, the capital of the Tadzhik SSR, was given its pre-1929 name of Dyushambe. There is no reason to believe that these changes were greeted with general enthusiasm by the populations of these cities. There was some grumbling in Stalingrad, apparently arising from a feeling that, since the name had acquired such important connotations as a result of the great battle of the Second World War, it could now stand on its own, without particular reference to the discredited Soviet dictator. In Moscow, Soviet airport personnel were visibly amused by travellers who asked when the plane to "Volgograd" was due to leave. An Embassy traveller who visited Stalinabad before the name-change was struck by the pride with which his Intourist guide told of the rise of the city, from the poverty-striken hamlet of Dyushambe to today's proud capital city, a symbol of which was its renaming as Stalinabad.

While a multitude of name-changes less publicized than these three are undoubtedly in progress, the de-Stalinization campaign has its limits, if these are only set, for the moment, by the slow grinding of the administrative and technical apparatus which must implement it. Thus, the Stalinskaya subway station in Moscow continues to bear this name and there has as yet been no official indication that the Stalinskiy raion of Moscow oblast' has been re-named. Stamps depicting the dictator continue to be sold in thematic collections. And a certain caution is evident in press treatment of the "vicious consequences" of the cult of Stalin's personality. One journalist, for example, while deploring the cult as tantamount to an effort to deify Stalin (A-355, November 17), says of his "crimes" only that "he permitted arbitrary rule and abuses of power, mass repressions and murders of totally innocent people," whereas Khrushchev, in his October 27 speech, had depicted Stalin as directly responsible for the deaths of leading Party members.

The "chief ideologist" of the "anti-Party group," MOLOTOV, returned to Moscow on November 12, an event which went unreported by Soviet news media. There were unconfirmed rumors that he, KAGANOVICH, and MALENKOV had been excluded from the Party. The question of exclusion was not raised again in Soviet press treatment of the "group", which continued to show signs of the divergencies evident at the Congress and since. Thus, all eight members of the "group", including VOROSHILOV, were named by Moscow Party Secretary DEMICHEV at a meeting on November 14, while, on the same day in Leningrad, his counterpart SPIRIDONOV named only the troika Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov "and others" (D-403, November 16).

There were indications that all this was puzzling to at least some Soviet citizens. According to one report, people were asking why it had been necessary to drag the attack on Stalin into the open as Khrushchev had done at the XXII

Congress, and the campaign against the "anti-Party group" was regarded simply as incomprehensible (A-356, Nov. 17). In his November 14 speech to the Moscow Party aktiv, Demichev addressed himself to the question of whether it had been worthwhile to dwell again upon the "anti-Party group", and said emphatically that it had been (D-403 [illegible] and an article in the trade-union newspaper Trud, in an attempt to answer [illegible]ns the editor had received from readers, gave four reasons for pursui[illegible]alinization and continuing the attack on the "anti-Party group" at the XXII C[illegible]ess (A-355).

9. A new Head for the Secret Police (KGB). 43-year old A. N. SHELEPIN, who on October 31, 1961, became the first secret-police chief since S.D.IGNATIEV also to hold concurrently the title of Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU, has been relieved as Chairman of the Committee of State Security (KGB) "in connection with /his/ transfer to other work" (Pravda, November 14,1961). He has been replaced by 37-year-old V. Ye. SEMICHASTNYY, like Shelepin an alumnus of the Komsomol apparatus and of the Central Committee Section on Party Organs for Union Republics. His most recent job had been Second Secretary of the Azerbaidzhanian Communist Party, a position he assumed in the wake of a purge in that Party's leadership.

Like V. S. TIKUNOV, who was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Russian Republic in July, 1961 (A-71, July 28), Semichastnyy has a Komsomol background, has worked in the past under Shelepin, and is a candidate-member of the CC-CPSU.

Additionally, Semichastnyy was a Komsomol secretary in the Ukraine during Khrushchev's service there as Party Secretary. Previously, his chief claim to fame had been his attack on Boris PASTERNAK shortly after the latter had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

COMMENT: In his work as Secretary of the Central Committee, Shelepin will presumably continue to supervise secret-police work. The separation of the post of KGB Chairman from that of Secretary of the CC underlines the regime's desire to present a picture of continuing strict observance of "Socialist legality" and of continuing strict subordination of the secret police to the Party.

10. Additional Post-Congress Personnel Adjustments. There were two other interesting personnel announcements during the week.

(a) G. I. VORONOV's agricultural responsibilities appear to be confirmed in the obituary notice of Ye. S. KROTKOV, only recently appointed a first deputy minister of agriculture of the RSFSR, who died on November 11 (Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 12, 1961). Voronov, Deputy Chairman of the CC's Bureau for the RSFSR, headed the list of mourners, while the name of its Chairman, Khrushchev, does not appear. Since other signers include RSFSR Premier POLYANSKIY, the Chief of the CC's Section on Agriculture for the RSFSR, and the RSFSR Minister of Agriculture, the implication is strong that Voronov, the only new member elected to the Presidium of the CC-CPSU following the XXII Congress, is responsible for agricultural matters.

(b) ... N. I. SMIRNOV, deputy chairman of Gosplan, has been named a member of the USSR Council of Ministers (Pravda, November 16, 1961). His appointment is consistent with the status given many deputy chairmen of Gosplan and appears to be a continued application of the rule, apparently employed at the XXII Congress, that members of the Council of Ministers would, with rare exceptions, be members of one of the central Party organs. Smirnov was elected a candidate-member of the CC at the XXII Congress.

11. Another Trial in Leningrad. Pravda, on November 16, announced that a ring of criminals had stolen 410,977 (old) roubles from 15 shops in Leningrad. The report stated that the ringleader, sentenced on three previous occasions for "speculation", had not "performed socially useful work for a long time" and continually and "systematically got drunk with his cohorts." He was sentenced to be shot under the May 5, 1961, law providing capital punishment for "especially dangerous criminals."

COMMENT: In the wake of the recent trials of Jews in Moscow and Leningrad (WEEKA No. 45), it is of interest that two of the four members of the ring KRAYZMAN and SHEYNIN, have Jewish names. There is, however, no discernible basis for connecting this new trial with the earlier ones. "Speculation" and other economic crimes are a constant subject of concern to the Soviet Government, and Leningrad has a large Jewish population.

MILITARY

(Negative)

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